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I. Introduction  
In the beginning was … state sovereignty, or so the oft-quoted statement by the International 
Court of Justice according to which “state sovereignty” is “the fundamental principle” (…) “on 
which the whole of international law rests”1 appears to indicate. There is a remarkable circularity 
at play between this now classic statement of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
and the fact that Western international lawyers often use the etiological myth (that is, a myth for 
the origins of things) of Westphalia 2  to retrace the very origins of their discipline to the 
emergence of the concept of state sovereignty itself. It comes, thus, as no wonder that in the 
early stages of the 21st century, when international law is portrayed in leading textbooks, as “an 
ubiquitous presence in global policy-making and in academic and journalistic commentary”,3 
international lawyers continue to speculate about the locus classicus of their discipline. The 
reaffirmation of the state-centric basis of the term coined by J. Bentham4 in 1789, which became 
widely employed on the occasion of the independence of the new Latin-American Republics from 
the Spanish Empire in the 1810s and 1820s, benefited greatly from this early association 
between sovereignty and post-colonial independence.5 It was in one of the new independent 
American Republics, Colombia, where the first ever chair of “international law” (or to use the 
original language, Derecho internacional) was established. This chair was occupied in 1827 by 
Ignacio de Herrera Vergara who, therefore, became the very first chair-holder of international law 
                                                          
 University Lecturer in Law, Brunel Law School (Brunel University London). FHEA, LLB (U.C. Madrid), MA & Ph.D. 
(IUHEID, Geneva) LLM (Harvard). In the Spring and Summer of 2014, Visiting Scholar, Lauterpacht Research Centre 
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1 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at para. 263. 
2 S Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel 
and the Myth of Westphalia (Brill, 2004) 
3 J Crawford and M Koskenniemi (eds) Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge UP, 2011) 
4 J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). For a commentary, see MW Janis, 
“Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of International Law”, 78 American Journal of International Law (1984) 405.  
5 On International Law and Latin-America after decolonization, see e.g. L Obregón Tarazona “The Colluding Worlds 
of the Lawyer, the Scholar and the Policymaker: A View of International Law from Latin America”, 23 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal (2005) 145 and A Becker Lorca “International Law in Latin America or Latin American 
International Law? Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagination” 47 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1 (2006) 283 
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in the world. This seminal strong linkage between international law and state sovereignty - and its 
international legal corollaries, that is, the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention – 
would become even further entrenched when state sovereignty became the symbol for colonial 
peoples of “the hard-won prize of their own struggle for emancipation”6 during the second great 
historical decolonization process after the Second World War.  The historical cornerstone quality 
of state sovereignty for international law begins, however, to appear more disputable as soon as 
one scratches the surface of its post-colonially reinforced apparent inextricability. The 
state-centric conceptualization of international law – which, perhaps, would be, more coherently, 
captured within this paradigm, as inter (sovereign)-state law7 - appears, indeed, less pronounced 
in earlier terminological historical usages such as those of ius gentium, ius inter gentes, the law of 
peoples8 or, even, the law of nations. The latter was employed, along with the “law of nature”, in 
the endowment of several chairs in the 18th century following the cross-European influence of S. 
Pufendorf´s De Iure Naturae et Gentium published in 8 volumes in 1672. The state-centrism of 
international law was neither present in other partially equivalent terms which stretch far beyond 
the Latin-European political and intellectual tradition of international law.9  These include the 
Islamic as-Siyar whose first treatise, which dates back to the 9th century,10 is “considered the 
world earliest treatise of international law as a separate topic”.11  
 
Whereas contributions to the history of international law have traditionally revolved around the 
evolving notion of state sovereignty, the latter is, needless to say, very far from being relegated to 
the history of international law. Far to the contrary, state sovereignty remains the gravitational 
centre of contemporary international law and it is, as such, explicit in everything contemporary 
international legal scholarship occupies itself with today. Just since the end of the Cold-War, state 
sovereignty has been made rhyme with multiple caveats. The notions of “conditional” and 
“democratic” sovereignty are among those on which more ink has been spilled in international 
legal scholarship. The notion of “conditional sovereignty” has been gaining momentum pursuant 
to the early 21st century´s fast-track evolution of the notion of “responsibility to protect”.12 This 
was filtered, eo nomine for the first time,13 in Security Council Res. 197,14 which approved a 
no-fly zone over Libya,15 to, almost immediately afterwards, fall down, on the wake of the Syrian 
                                                          
6 M Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order, (Holmes and Maier, 1979) 123. 
7 The rich connotations of this terminological point can in part be found developed in J Fisch, “Peoples and Nations” 
in B Fassbender and A Peters. The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford UP, 2012) 27 
8See, interestingly, K Tuori “The Reception of Ancient Legal Thought in Early Modern International Law“, in B 
Fassbender and A Peters. The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford UP, 2012) 1012. 
9 See further I De la Rasilla, “Medieval international Law”, Oxford Bibliographies of International Law (Ed. A Carty) 
(2014) 
10 For an English translation, see M Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations. Shaybani's Siyar, (The John Hopkins 
Press, 1966) 
11 C Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 1988) 130. 
12 Since 2009, there is even a journal Global Responsibility to Protect which defines itself as the “premier journal for 
the study and practice of the responsibility to protect (R2P)” It is accessible here: 
http://www.brill.com/global-responsibility-protect (last visited June 2014) 
13 A precedent following article 42 under Chapter VII can e.g. be found in  S/RES/1706 (2006)  where the SC 
recalls its  “Res. 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter alia the provisions 
of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document” . 
14 S.C. Res. 1973, 6, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 (Mar.17, 2011) 
15 The SC Res. 1973 builds upon paras. 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome adopted by General Assembly 
in its Resolution 60/1,2005  by which the assembled heads of state and government declare  themselves to be 
“prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with 
the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” 
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crisis, from its ephemeral rise to the top of the post-1945 UN system of collective security.16 The 
conceptual rise of the notion “responsibility to protect”, which had been gradually replacing the 
notion of “humanitarian intervention” in international legal scholarship since the early years of the 
21st century, marked, for some of its proponents, like A Peters, the definitive enshrinement of 
“humanity” as the “alpha and omega” of sovereignty.17  On the other hand, another conceptual 
combination, which by linking international human rights´ protection and sovereignty has also 
caused rivers of ink to flow, in the post-90ies’ international legal scholarship is that of “democratic 
sovereignty”. The attempt to link the full exercise of the external legal attributes of state 
sovereignty to the existence of democratically legitimized domestic forms of government, which 
knew of some precedents in the 1930ies,18 became apparent in the internationalist liberal trends 
that left their mark in the scholarship of the first post-Cold War era as well as in the critical retorts 
that these received in international legal scholarship. Indeed, taking issue with post-1989 liberal 
trends in international legal scholarship, a renewed intellectual critical approach coined new 
scholarly labels such as “liberal anti-pluralism” or 19  “liberal millenarism” 20  to counter-act the 
liberal internationalism that ensued the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. They did so by delving critically in an array of post-cold war theories like the “Kantian 
theory of international law”,21 the “democratic entitlement school”,22“the liberal internationalist 
dual agenda”,23 “Rawlsian liberalism”,24 “liberal cosmopolitism”,25 or the scholarly positions of 
noted representatives of the New Haven school,26 a “method of international law” that also goes 
by the names of “configurative jurisprudence” and “policy oriented jurisprudence”.27 Among other 
critical worries, like those regarding the underlying definition of the so-called democratic principle 
in international law (see e.g. low-intensity democracy, procedural vs substantive types of 
democracy) and/or the neo-liberal policies and imperial agendas that were being allegedly 
advanced by the rise of “democratic liberalism in international legal theory”,28 critical approaches 
to  international law also stressed how the addition of a democratic caveat to the principle of 
state sovereignty affected the legal-formal isonomy of states through the introduction, as 
                                                          
16 Notwithstanding its reappearance also in 2011 in SC Res. 1975 (30th March, 2011) regarding Ivory Coast, and in 
an operational paragraph in Res. 1996 (2011) on South Sudan. 
17 A Peters “Humanity as the Alpha & Omega of International Law” 20 The European Journal of International Law 
(2009) 513. 
18 See e.g. J Barthelemy, “Politique Intérieure et Droit International” (1937) 59 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International, at pp. 490-501. 
19 G Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge 
UP, 2004). 
20  S Marks, “The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses” 8 European Journal of 
International Law (1997) 449 
21 FR Tesón, “The Kantian Theory of International Law”, 92 Columbia Law Review (1992) 53. See also FR Tesón, A 
Philosophy of International Law (Westview Press, 1998)  
22 T M Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) 
46. 
23  A M Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda”, 87 American 
Journal of International Law (1993) 205, 
24 J Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, (Harvard UP, 1999) 
25 KC Tan, “International Toleration: Rawlsian versus Cosmopolitan” 18 Leiden Journal of International Law (2005) 
685. 
26 M W Reisman, “Sovereignity and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” 84 American Journal of 
International Law (1990) 866. Reisman defended a “contemporary change in content of the term sovereignty”, 
according to which “international law still protects sovereignty but it is, not surprisingly, the people’s sovereignty, 
rather than the sovereigns’ sovereignty”. 
27  For a recollection of studies, see S. McDougal & H.D.Laswell, Studies in World Public Order. (New Haven Press, 
1987)  
28 G.Simpson, “Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory” 15 The Australian Yearbook 
of International Law (1994) 103.  
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highlighted by G. Simpson, of “a threshold requirement of law-making at the two levels of 
inter-state and intra-state legitimacy”.29  
 
The principle of equivalence of political regimes in international law remains almost a century 
after it began to attract the interest of international legal scholarship30 still the generally accepted 
normative point de départ for positivist approaches of international law. State sovereignty, despite 
the post-1989 legacy of epithets, like those of “conditional” or “democratic”, to accompany it, also 
remains over-present in contemporary discussions.31 Today, international legal scholars continue 
to refer to state sovereignty either to vindicate it as an “obscure representative of an ideal against 
disillusionment with global power and expert rule”,32 to imagine new epistemological horizons for 
it beyond the state,33 to dispute it in the field of analytic jurisprudence because of what the late R. 
Dworkin considered, in its latest published work, was its untenable association with 
state-consent,34 or in order to propose new ways of ordering and conceptualize it in view of the 
growing importance of non-state actors as subjects of an international legal order that transitioned 
from a pre-institutional to an institutionalised form some time ago already.35 In fact, everything 
under the sun of contemporary international law, every case, every international legal reflection, 
even the most radical and bold departures from state-sovereignty, are still biting around the 
apparent centrality and intrinsic conceptual inescapability in contemporary international legal 
scholarship of what L. Henkin called “that S-word”.36 And, should we trust M. Koskenniemi, one 
of the contributors to one of the two volumes under review “whatever changes our political and 
juridical languages may undergo in the foreseeable future, sovereignty will remain part of them”.37  
 
Sovereignty is, in fact, one of the two core themes that both books under review have in common. 
If H.Kalmo and Q.Skinner’s edited collection Sovereignty in Fragments takes on what the editors 
call the “master concept of legal and political philosophy”,38 J. Trachtman stresses in his The 
Future of International Law stresses that one of his goals is to account for the acceleration and 
accentuation of numerous exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm.39 Trachtman, who considers 
the latter phenomenon to be “the central crisis in international law”,40 proposes to influence the 
future of international law by making use of a social science functionalist paradigm “which 
accepts that the state is contingent, and that international law tends to constrain – indeed, to 
mould – the state on the basis of functional efficiency”.41 The second core-theme that both books 
share is inter-disciplinarity. Whereas, in Trachtman’s book, inter-disciplinarity makes for the very 
methodological lenses through which the current limitations of sovereignty for international law 
                                                          
29 Simpson (1994) 115. 
30 E Root “The Effect of Democracy on International Law”, in Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law (1917), 2-11.   
31 Including in its most nationalistic-sovereignistic legal forms, see e.g. I De la Rasilla “The Dilemma of the Three 
Wise Monkeys? Transnational Legal Sources in Constitutional Interpretation and the US Supreme Court”  4 
Transnational Legal Theory 2 (2013), 227-257. 
32 M Koskenniemi, “What use for Sovereignty Today?” Asian Journal of International Law, 1 (2011) 61, 70   
33N Tsagourias (ed.) Transnational Constitutionalism: International Law and European Perspectives (2007)  
34  R Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law” 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs (2013) 1.    
35 D Kennedy, "The Move to Institutions," 8 Cardozo Law Review (1987) 841.  
36 L Henkin, “That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera”, 68 Fordham Law 
Review (1999) 1.   
37 M Koskenniemi, “Conclusion: Vocabularies of Sovereignty - The Powers of a Paradox” in H Kalmo and Q Skinner 
(eds) Sovereignty in Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 222, 
222. 
38H Kalmo and Q Skinner “Introduction: A Concept in Fragments” in H Kalmo and Q Skinner (Eds) Sovereignty in 
Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 1, 24  
39 J P Trachtman, The Future of International Law, Global Government (Cambridge UP, 2013) 18. 
40  Ibid., 18  
41 Ibid. 
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are examined, the goal, of Kalmo and Skinner´s multi-authored collection is in its turn to provide a 
multi-disciplinary tour de force about the notion of sovereignty to which constitutional lawyers, 
historians, international lawyers, international relations scholars, political philosophers and legal 
practitioners contribute. Therefore, inter-disciplinarity appears, in both books, as the kaleidoscope 
through which (to paraphrase the subtitle of H.Kalmo and Q.Skinner’s edited collection) “the past, 
present and future of a contested concept”, is examined.  
 
II. Sovereignty and its Inter-Disciplinary Contestants    
 
The editors of Sovereignty in Fragments open their book with an intriguing and stimulatingly 
complex introito (or prologue). This revolves around the “consubstantially polemical character”42 
of sovereignty as a “contested concept” in both political and legal philosophy. The editors aim, by 
taking a “parallax view”43 of the concept of sovereignty, at fostering “inter-disciplinary dialogues” 
(…) and “to create bridges between fields of enquiry which have hitherto been linked by tenuous 
cross-references (if at all)”.44The inter-disciplinary and hybridizing spirit that animates the book is 
fully embraced by M Koskenniemi. In the conclusive essay to the volume Koskenniemi points to 
how “an apparently endless epistemological regress” emerges as soon as “the quest for the 
explanatory authority of a (single) discipline”45 to tackle sovereignty is addressed. Koskenniemi 
exemplifies this conceptual whirlwind through reference to the never-ending closure-quality of the 
circle of deferrals of disciplinary discourse. The latter transit, in an epistemological symphony-like 
manner, “from law to politics”, “from history to sociology”, “from sociology to psychology”, “from 
psychology to philosophy” as well as, one is led to assume, vice versa, as well as in any other 
imaginable combination of disciplinary vocabularies one might brought together to examine the 
notion of sovereignty.  
 
Several contributors, in harmony with this spirit of fostering inter-disciplinary dialogues, have 
answered the call for a “more historical approach” to sovereignty. This call is, in the editors´ view, 
justified because no discipline can be blind to the historicity of sovereignty or, to paraphrase, as 
the editors in their embracement of a genealogical approach to the concept do, H. Laski, 
“Sovereignty, liberty, authority, personality – these are the words of which we want alike the 
history and the definition; or rather, we want the history because its substance is in fact the 
definition”.46 This critical historical method47 targets the reification of the present by showing its 
contingency in the light of what the Kalmo and Skinner call history´s “very strangeness, by 
making us attend to the multiplicity of paths we did not follow”.48 The bulk of the historically 
oriented contributions on the concept of sovereignty is represented by the chapters written by 
Q.Skinner on the sovereign state, D. Baranger on the apparition of sovereignty, P.Pirimae on the 
Westphalian myth as well as, more tangentially, J. Bartelson and H. Kalmo on, respectively, the 
just war tradition and state formation in international law.  
 
                                                          
42 H Kalmo and Q Skinner (2011) 24. 
43 Ibid., 5.  
44 Ibid., 24.  
45 Koskenniemi (2011) 225. 
46 H Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and other Essays (Yale University Press, 1931) 314 (cited by H Kalmo 
and Q Skinner (2011) 11 
47 On the historical method in international law, see e.g. A Orford, “On International Legal Method” 1.1. London 
Review of International Law (2013) 166 See also Lesaffer, R.C.H, “International Law and Its History: The Story of an 
Unrequited Love”,  M Craven, M Fitzmaurice and M Vogiatzi (eds) Time, History and International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2004)   
48 H Kalmo and Q Skinner (2011) 10.  
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Q. Skinner, one of the founders of the "Cambridge School" of the history of political thought,49 
offers a genealogical survey of the sovereign state in Anglophone traditions of legal and political 
thought.50 He does so by contextualizing how the concept of the “state”, which only began to be 
widely employed in the late 16th century and early 17th centuries in English language, was used in 
“successive debates about the nature of public power”. 51The author´s aim, in resorting to a 
contextual genealogy of the conceptual usage of the term “state”, is that of re-examining Hobbes´ 
“fictional theory” of the state and study the latter´s great influence on the seventeenth and 
eighteen century’s international legal thought. Skinner, who also revisits the conceptual evolution 
of the “fictional theory” in English political thought throughout the 19th century and 20th centuries, 
attempts to prove the applicability of his contextualist method of interpretation of the history of 
political thought to the task of re-imagining “the state in different and perhaps more fruitful 
ways”.52 Also engaged in a genealogical pursuit in the history of ideas is D Baranger who seeks 
to throw light on the way “in which sovereignty has appeared, or rather has been said to appear, 
in modern political consciousness”. 53  In particular, Baranger´s work delves, first, into the 
discourse of sovereignty in the debates of French légistes such as Bodin, Loyseau or Coquille in 
the 16th and early 17th centuries and, secondly, on the uses made of sovereignty by Locke and 
Rousseau in the eighteen century. Focusing on how “marks of sovereignty” are retraced to a 
common origin in different legal discourses, Baranger applies an approach to “legal concepts in a 
manner that is usually restricted to empirical objects” 54  in order to uncover the processes 
underlying the intellectual efforts to construct the notion of unitary sovereignty. The chapters by 
D. Pirimae and J. Bartelson continue the efforts of previous contributions of reading historical 
materials through different conceptual lenses. They do so by extending their inquiry into the 
relationship between sovereignty and iustum bellum, or just war doctrines. On the first hand, 
Pirimae “engages” the history of international law55 by re-examining the Peace of Westphalia as 
a foundational myth for the discipline of international law.56 Pirimae differentiates three levels of 
criticism towards what Beaulac has called the “etiological myth”57 of Westphalia for international 
lawyers: firstly, a textual criticism; secondly, a criticism based on the historical analysis of the 
post-Westphalian system and, finally, a critique addressed to the normative idea of sovereignty 
which disputes whether this “was actually present in seventeenth century thought”.58 Pirimae´s 
examination of H Grotius’ thought is complemented by an analysis of how the normative ideas of 
early modern European thinkers and jurists were reflected in the actual international practice of 
that time and age. Bartelson, on the other hand, examines the argumentative presence in 
contemporary just war theorists – ranging from M. Walzer to M. Doyle – of the implicit social 
contract underlying the relationship political authority and the legitimate use of force which is a 
topic that has gained new prominence as non-state actors and new kinds of warfare have 
                                                          
49 Q Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas". 8 History and Theory 1 (1969) 3. 
50 See Q Skinner, “The sovereign state: a genealogy” H Kalmo and Q Skinner (Eds) Sovereignty in Fragments. The 
Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 26. 
51 Skinner (2011) 26. 
52 Ibid., 27.  
53  See further, D Baranger “The apparition of sovereignty”, in H Kalmo and Q Skinner (eds) Sovereignty in 
Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 47.  
54 Ibid., 49.  
55 For the expression see T Skouteris, “Engaging History in International Law”, in D. Kennedy and J.M. Beneyto 
(eds.), New Approaches to International Law: The European and American Experiences (2012) 99.  
56 See, bibliographically, I De la Rasilla del Moral “History of International Law, 1550-1700” Oxford Bibliographies of 
International Law (2013) 1. 
57 Beaulac (2004)  
58P Piirimae, “The Westphalian myth and the idea of external sovereignty”, in H Kalmo and Q Skinner (eds) 
Sovereignty in Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 64.   
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emerged on the international stage.59 Bartelson retraces the circular argumentative structure that 
exists between conceptions of political authority and the right to wage war back to ancient legal 
and political theory from the writings of Saint Augustine and commentaries to Gratian’s decree to 
the writings of F de Vitoria, H Grotius and E de Vattel. His historical analysis allows him to 
conclude that contemporary contestations of sovereignty as the sole site of legitimate political 
authority appear to “restore the default settings of political thought and action” after what he terms 
a long post-“Westphalian interlude” when the “locus of legitimate authority remained relatively 
uncontested”.60  The last of the contributors to the historical intellectual evolution of sovereignty 
is H Kalmo who engages with a more recent history of international legal thought (from Jellinek to 
Kelsen and Hart) in his attempt to revisit the classical question to know whether the birth of a new 
sovereign state is a de facto or a de iure phenomenon in the light of the practice of the new Baltic 
states after 1989. 61 
   
The interconnectedness of the history of political thought and the history of international legal 
thought explored by these contributions finds an immediate echo in the contemporary work of 
historians of international law international lawyers. Indeed, the historical turn in international law 
has done much to contribute to the greater awareness on the intersecting nature of 
compartmentalized knowledge as well as to evidence the traditional inter-disciplinary pollination 
of the history of international law which blends international relations theory and its historical 
discourse, legal history, the history of ideas and political thought. Moreover, scholarly 
investigation into the hitherto traditionally underdeveloped field of the history of international law 
is currently finding new channels of intellectual exploration - movements, collective identities, 
non-state actors, cultures, events and individuals. The history of international law is, moreover, 
extending on the wake of on-going intra-disciplinary specialization beyond a still limited set of 
histories of international legal concepts and institutions. New research on the history of 
international law is also being gradually developed from a greater diversity of geographical – 
national, regional, even trans-civilizational or encounters’-based – standpoints. Such an 
enhanced inter-disciplinarization and the increasingly self-perceived independence of the history 
of international law as a field of intellectual is, furthermore, already impacting the study of the past 
of the discipline and spurring the emergence of a robust field of comparative international legal 
history in both regional62and national traditions.63 Whereas the turn to the history in international 
law is opening new channels of scholarly inquiry and fostering the updating of the study of the 
respective international legal traditions, such an on-going dynamic transformation of the history of 
international law is, indeed, far from being alien to the European integration process. Aware of the 
impact of the European process of regional economic and political integration upon contemporary 
understandings of sovereignty, several chapters of Sovereignty in Fragments tackle, indeed, the 
evolving fate of sovereignty within what is today´s most influential conceptual test-tube for the 
experimentation with juridical vocabularies in addressing sovereignty. 
 
One is, indeed, bound to agree with the editor’s view that “no treatment of the contemporary 
tribulations of the concept of sovereignty would be complete without an analysis of the European 
                                                          
59 J Bartelson, “Double binds: sovereignty and the just war tradition”, in H Kalmo and Q Skinner (eds) Sovereignty in 
Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 81. 
60 Bartelson (2011) 95.  
61 H Kalmo, “A matter of fact? The many faces of sovereignty” in H Kalmo and Q Skinner (eds) Sovereignty in 
Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge UP, 2011) 114. 
62  See e.g. A Becker Lorca, “Universal International Law. Nineteenth Century Histories of Imposition and 
Appropriation” Harvard International Law Journal (2010) 477, 486. 
63  See e.g. Y Gamarra & I De la Rasilla (Eds). Historia del Pensamiento Iusinternacionalista español del siglo XX 
(Thompson Reuters Aranzadi, 2012). See also C. Joerges , N. S. Ghaleigh & M. Stolleis (eds.) Darker Legacies of 
Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism Over Europe and Its Legal Traditions (2003 
Sovereignty through the Inter-disciplinary Kaleidoscope - unedited version 
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral © Edited version available at 84 Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) 130-152   
Union”64. Moreover, this European academic debate, which is informed by tensions between 
descriptive, prescriptive and experimental projections and conceptualizations about the future of 
the EU, and between the numerous nomenclatures which are constantly been put forward in 
order to apprehend its evolving nature, not only exerts a considerable influence in shaping the 
political future of the EU itself but also that of other parallel regional processes of integration. 
Moreover, the EU debate also engenders intellectual frameworks, discourses and vocabularies 
which often re-germinate within international legal thought and within the study of international 
organizations, thus favouring a phenomenon of conceptual communicating vessels. The on-going 
disaggregation of state sovereignty in the EU has been influenced by a juridical vocabulary 
developed by the now Court of Justice of the European Union. In 1963, the latter took the first 
step towards the development of the gradually reformed consent-based international treaties that 
constitute the EU evolving foundation, by characterizing the EU (by then, the European Economic 
Community) as “new legal order.65 Two contributors to Sovereignty in Fragments, N. MacCormick 
and M.Troper introduce the conceptual transformational possibilities of the processes of on-going 
transformation, diffusion and transfer of the classical state sovereignty in the EU. A leading 
contributor to the EU debate, M. Troper revisits in his chapter a plethora of phenomena, ranging 
from privatization to globalization, that have been argumentatively employed to underpin the 
vaunted crisis of the sovereign state. He does so in order to confront the puzzle of whether “at the 
present stage, it is true (…) that the state can no more be characterized as sovereign”66 in the 
legal sense. Troper, who devotes a particular attention to the process of European construction in 
his analysis, relies in particular on the French constitutional scholar Carré de Malberg’s three 
meanings of the word “sovereignty” in order to critically examine their respective presence in 
contemporary legal discourses. The second contributor to the examination of the impact of the 
European integration process upon the contemporary understanding of sovereignty in Kalmo and 
Skinner´s edited collection is the late N. MacCormick who was a long-standing proponent of the 
case for the characterization of both the EU and its member states as “post-sovereign entities” 
and of Europe as a “locus for post-sovereignty”. MacCormick characterized the latter as a horizon 
for “subsidiarity and polycentric democracy in the governance of Europe”.67 In his chapter, while 
admitting the purchase of other conceptualizations of sovereignty in the EU framework such as 
that of late-sovereignty argued by N. Walker, MacCormick examines sovereignty as both a 
“cluster” and a “contested concept 68  and presents a new version of his case for the 
post-sovereignty thesis “applied either to the question of internal sovereignty as possessed by 
parliaments in states, or to external sovereignty in the light of the constitutional order both of the 
member states and of the Union collectively”.69Following on the steps of discussions on the 
phenomenon of demise of the state and the rise of post-sovereignty in European legal thought, 
the chapter by P. Praet concerns itself, in its turn, with the possible consequences of this evolving 
state of affairs for the Rechtsstaat (or rule of law). This, together with democracy, stand, 
according to this author, as the main “touchstones against which state policies and actions are 
critically evaluated”. 70  Against this background, P Praet introduces the notion of “optimum 
sovereignty” which, he suggests, can be “determined by a trade-off between the benefits of 
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increased protection of individuals´ rights and the costs of heteronomy”.71 Such a trade-off is 
presented to a rational actor when he is given the option to choose between safeguarding a legal 
order´s sovereignty or, by contrast, to support its adherence to a supra-national Rechtsstaat as 
the one embodied by the EU which the author characterizes as one where currently “certain core 
elements of the rule of law are (not) upheld”.72 In this scenario, a rational decision-maker would, 
according P.Praet, ultimately base its decision on each legal order´s respective adequacy to the 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit understood as a synthesis of formal and material elements of what grosso 
modo is the democratic rule of law. 
 
A good way of rounding off these enlightening perspectives into some of the sovereignty-related 
conceptual debates spurring from the European process of regional integration is S. Krasner’s 
international relations´ approach to test the fate of sovereignty à la européenne for the rest of the 
world. 73S. Krasner adopts a bird´s-eye realist view of the international chessboard by dividing 
the current states of the world in different categories depending on whether they share what he 
defines as the “analytically and empirically distinct” elements of sovereignty. These are broadly 
identified by Krasner to be those of “international legal sovereignty”, “Westphalian/Vattelian 
sovereignty” and “domestic sovereignty”74 which are not “always conjoined in practice”.75  In 
mapping the contemporary world through these lenses, Krasner comes up with three great 
categories. The first of these categories is composed by the “modern world of conventional 
sovereignty” with around 84 states, including the great superpowers the US, China and Russia, 
all of which possess the three distinct attributes of state sovereignty. The second category, which 
Krasner terms the “post-modern world”, comprises mainly all EU member states as the latter 
comply with both the criteria of “international legal” and “domestic sovereignty”, but not with the 
Westphalian/Vattelian type of sovereignty. Finally, the third category is reserved for the 
“pre-modern world”. Depending on the sources of reference employed to categorize both failed 
and badly governed states, this category, according to this author, comprises between 37 to 73 
countries all of which possess “international legal sovereignty”, but not “domestic sovereignty” 
and may or not possess the attributes of “Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty”.  
 
Krasner’s IR realist perspective constitutes a refreshing zooming out from the theoretical hermetic 
nooks and crannies of the historical, constitutional, legal-international and EU legal-based 
analysis presented in Sovereignty in Fragments around sovereignty, understood as the “provider 
of the dominant logic of appropriateness for organizing political life”.76 Against this background, 
two further contributions by J. Lipping and A. Negri respectively push post-foundational political 
thought and post-modern philosophical speculation around the concept of sovereignty towards 
new extremes. J. Lipping, writing in a post-foundational vein, goes a step beyond the framework 
provided by the current debates on the fate of sovereignty triggered by the vaunted contemporary 
withering of the state, in order to “rethink sovereignty altogether outside the classical notion of the 
state”.77 Lipping approaches the conceptual decoupling of which, since Bodin and Hobbes, has 
been the self-reinforcing “absolute centre of political thought and political practice” so as to 
embrace what he terms an on-going “major horizon shift in the meaning of social and political 
concepts”. According to this author, engaging with the “growing non-correspondence between the 
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old conceptual paradigm” and the post-modern condition´s “changing institutional or social 
context” opens new ontological possibilities in the representation of the proper locus of “the 
political”. This is one that the author identifies as framed by the “political parallax par excellence”; 
that is, the one provided by the “at once intimate and impossible” conceptual – and irreducibly 
dislocated - relationship of, respectively, Arendt and Schmitt with regard to “the political”. This line 
of introspective abstract reflection leads Lipping to carve out a “certain conception of political 
space” that he suggestively calls öffentlichkeit (“the public”). This new space offers, according to 
Lipping, some prospects and opportunities for the concept of sovereignty as a carrier for a “new 
way of thinking about political matters, about the human condition, about being –in-the-world and 
living-together”. The celebrated Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, A Negri in its turn 
approaches the question to “how to escape the fetish of sovereignty as the concept of 
government in modernity”78 by delving into three perspectives that, according to this author, 
justify the consideration that sovereignty is in crisis within post-modern thought. These are, firstly, 
the perspective brought about by the biological transformation à la Foucault of the concept of 
sovereignty; secondly, the perspective on sovereignty which resulted from the application to the 
concept of the autopoietic approach and societal constitutionalism à la Luhmann and his 
followers; and, thirdly, the profound modification of the concept of sovereignty operated at the 
hands of the United Nations’ legal experts. Negri penetrates these three perspectives in order to 
carve a new intellectual space for sovereignty at the interstices of what he terms government, 
exception and governance.  So, “where do we find ourselves” (regarding sovereignty) “after the 
dusk” (to echo the editors’ own words) “from the work of post-modern demystifications has 
settled”?79 M. Koskenniemi, in his conclusive chapter, approaches this question by pointing to the 
never-ending closure of the circle of deferrals of disciplinary discourse.80 Indeed, Koskenniemi 
concludes that “learning the different vocabularies of sovereignty is a useful act of enlightenment 
(“the sovereignty of reason”)” and one that “will also make us more efficient users of those 
languages”.81 However, Koskenniemi argues, although, by doing so, we may learn to be better 
equipped in the strategic use of the different languages of sovereignty, “we shall remain unable to 
tame and constrain sovereignty within definite terms”.82 A similar conclusion seems to be shared 
by the editors themselves who also acknowledge that, instead of the obtainment of “an all-round 
view of sovereignty”, what may, perhaps, be unveiled by inter-disciplinary dialogues from 
scholarly fields, which share a common fragmented nature, is a “jigsaw puzzle with pieces that 
simply refuse to fit together”.83 
  
Although many of the contributions to this highly complex book may not grant themselves easily 
to the reader, the truth remains that to navigate through the porous borders of compartmentalized 
academic knowledge in the pursuance of an even chimerical “all- round view of the concept of 
sovereignty” 84 has the potential to lead to new types of enriching osmosis and intellectual 
synergies for all fields of reflective inquiry involved. This becomes apparent in the conclusive 
chapter of Sovereignty in Fragments in which Koskenniemi who in his post-2000s work, has often 
heralded a ‘culture of formalism’ in international law85 offers another an unsettling prescient on 
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the on-going evolution of a new understanding of “sovereignty”. He does so by highlighting ‘how 
globalisation means the increasing authority of technical and economic vocabularies and systems 
of expertise that seek to manage global problems so as to attain optimally effective solutions’ and 
by baptising these ‘new forms of power—global, informal and legitimate’—as ‘the new 
sovereignty.’86 In highlighting this theme, Koskenniemi´s chapter engages in a silent dialogue 
with the core-themes of both sovereignty and inter-disciplinarity that Sovereignty in Fragments 
shares with the second volume under review where J. Trachtman constructs a normative social 
scientific functionalist theory to attempt to bear on the future of international law.   
 
III. Back to the Future of International Law? 
In The Future of International Law. Global Government,87 J. Trachtman attempts the herculean 
task of trying to bridle the overwhelming character of our day and age by radiographing the 
present times through the construction of a comprehensive social science functionalist 
methodological perspective. Trachtman´s reinterpretation of functionalism is addressed to give an 
answer to what he considers are the many contemporary exceptions to the Westphalian 
paradigm and – what he terms – its “centrepiece, untrammelled sovereignty”. 88  The author 
attempts to show that the Westphalian paradigm is bound to be replaced by what he terms the 
“social science functionalist paradigm”. This is one that accepts that “the state is contingent, and 
that international law tends to constrain – indeed, to mould – the state on the basis of its 
functional efficiency”.89 Trachtman´s prediction of the evolution of such on-going paradigmatic 
shift is based on the gradual unfolding of a series of phenomena that he examines under the new 
lenses of an inter-disciplinary methodology which is rooted in new institutional economics 
(including constitutional economics). The phenomena to which Trachtman brings to bear his 
normative (and yet not teleological) social-scientific reinterpretation of functionalist and 
neo-functionalist approaches to international integration in order to produce a methodology with 
the aspiration to analyse integration on a global scale, include the examination of predictions of 
changing trends in areas such as globalization, economic development, demography, technology 
and democracy. His methodology also extents to the examination of the possible evolution of 
cooperation problems in selected functional areas such as those of cyberspace, human rights, 
international environment and health regulation, international finance, trade, intellectual property 
protection, migration and investment. Different techniques, including price theory, transaction 
costs economics, game theory, contract theory are brought together by Trachtman under 
comparative institutional cost-benefits analysis in a book that he makes an express point in 
defining as “welfarist” in approach. 90  The predictive outcome of the application of such 
functionalist social scientific paradigm, which is one that understands the “sovereignty of states in 
utilitarian and contingent terms”, 91  is the “increasing production of international law and of 
organizational structures” (…) which, in the author´s view, will increasingly “be seen to perform 
governmental functions”.92 
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The perception that ”international law may grow in a way similar to municipal law”,93 which is the 
sense in which the author considers that “the future of international law is global government“, 94 
is, however, in Trachtman´s view, obscured by both the descriptive and predictive inaccuracy of a 
“state-dominated understanding of global society“.95This “state-dominated understanding” of the 
world does not give enough space to the appreciation that “international law will grow to 
supplement the state as a form of government in a federal or divided powers sense”.96Trachtman, 
who is persuaded that “perceptions and ideas mediate institutional change” and that “any 
self-conscious law reform must be based on some degree of anticipation of future conditions”97 
implements his sophisticated analytical methodology with the purpose “to illuminate the utility of 
international now and in the future in order to influence perceptions of the need for international 
law”.98 
 
Chapters 2 to 4 set the ground for his general analytical template to analyse the role of 
international law in international cooperation problems. These chapters also cater for the 
consideration that is due to the analysis of the role of domestic politics in underpinning the state´s 
role as a “dynamic aggregator of individual, group and coalitions preferences”.99  The linkage of 
this dual rational-framework which, respectively, examines the reasons for international law and 
the need to examine “domestic politics in order to understand why international law is made and 
why states comply with it”,100 to on-going trends in globalization, development, demography, 
technology and democracy is justified by the importance of predictions about these evolving 
factors as providers of “shocks to the existing equilibrium that change relative prices of different 
externalities, public goods, or other causes of international law”.101 More specifically, Chapter 2 
provides a “taxonomy of the types of circumstances that give rise to international cooperation, 
and the types of cooperation that seem better addressed through international law, as opposed to 
non-legal, or informal, cooperation”. 102   In particular, the author attempts to prove, in an 
argument, which is reminiscent of the late T Franck´s early examination of international law 
compliance pull, 103   that while “international cooperation can be useful under a variety of 
circumstances, including externalities, public goods, economies of scale and scope, and network 
externalities”, 104 the added value of international law (when compared to non-legal approaches) 
is that the former can help to “address cooperation problems that involve strong incentives to 
defect”105  in real-world situations. In Chapter 3, the author engages with several contributions to 
the literature on the liberal theory of international relations on the domestic causes of adherence 
to and compliance with international law (including contributions by Gourevitch, Putnam, 
Moravcsik, Mo, Dai and others). Trachtman does so in order to adapt the Grossman-Helpman 
model of the lobbying process in international trade negotiations to account for the potential of 
functional transnational linkage of domestic Public International Law lobbies under a 
policy-exchange contractual theory of international law. Having examined the internal dimension, 
Chapter 4 preoccupies itself with the potential for change brought to international law by current 
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predictions on the evolving dimensions of globalization, economic development, demography, 
technology and democratization. The author´s analysis is mainly based on positive predictions. 
These include so as, to provide some examples, the estimate that the growth of the “global 
middle class” will rise from 7.6 percent of the world´s population (440 m) to 16.1 % (1.2 b) in the 
next decades.106  Another example is the predictive positive effects on demands for international 
cooperation produced by the “Haasian feedback loop” that operates between globalization and 
the demands it places on international law107  in a scenario influenced by the prediction of more 
“cosmopolitan outlooks and more cultural and political homogenization resulting from 
demographic changes and migration waves” 108  and the prediction that 2052 the majority of 
countries of the world “will be governed democratically109”. In a nutshell, Trachtman considers 
that these series of anticipated future developments will have “important impacts on the demand 
and supply of international law”110 in the horizon that lies between 2012 and 2062.   
 
Chapters 5 and 9 examine in their turn different cooperation problems as they arise in different 
functional sectors. This functional sectorial extension to a selection of different areas of 
international legal scholarship serves the author to illustrate the analytical methodologies 
developed in chapters 2 and 3 within the horizon provided by the changing scenario of influencing 
global phenomena examined in Chapter 4. The aim of these sectorial chapters is to suggest legal 
and organizational responses that will cater for both contemporary and future greater demand for 
international law. According to the author, the challenges and opportunities for international law 
and global government brought about by the areas of cyberspace and cyber-security, 
international human rights, environmental protection and public health, global regulation of 
finance and trade, intellectual property, migration and investment whereas they call “for a specific 
type of international legal response”111 also involve common themes. Prominent among these 
common themes is that all of them show the inability of a “state-dominated understanding of 
global society“ to manage and apprehend them in an optimal manner. Each of the sectorial 
chapters involves the advancement of the methodological agenda of Trachman´s “functionalist 
social science paradigm” in international law to several functional areas of international legal 
development. For instance, Trachtman considers that current international human rights´ expert 
knowledge can benefit if those invested in this field of knowledge become more familiar with a 
“preference-based analytical approach to the demand and supply of international human-rights 
law”.112 Another example is that international environment lawyers and experts on international 
public health can benefit from examining international cooperation problems in areas such as 
“infectious disease, ozone-layer protection and climate change”113 through the application of a 
series of analytical templates that give salience to the externalities and public good aspects of 
these areas. Finally, Chapters 10 and 11 suggest methods of analysis of the challenges emerged 
from the increasing densification of international law and the risk of collision – but, also 
opportunities for positive synergies – which emerge from with the contemporary complexity and 
fragmentation of the international legal order. The analytical framework that Trachtman provides 
in Chapter 10 is oriented to help to account for these challenges “first as issues of horizontal 
allocation of jurisdiction, second as issues of vertical allocation of jurisdiction and, third as 
horizontal allocation of jurisdictions among international rules and organization”. 114  This 
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perspective is complemented, in Chapter 11, by an explanation of how the present state of 
international law is bound to generate an increasing demand of international legal constitutional 
norms and processes – introducing hierarchy and order or, at least. a set of coordinating 
mechanisms – as a corollary to the increase of supply of international legal rules and of the 
development of institutions of legislation, adjudication and enforcement that are bound to grow 
functionally as the demand for international law increases in the future. 
 
Trachtman´s book is a highly dedicated scholarly tour de force. It attempts to foster a truly 
methodological colonization of international law through the advancement of an economic 
rationality and an analytical tool-kit. These, in the author´s view, have much to contribute to the 
management of the present and the future of international law. The contemporary scholarly allure 
of the phenomena Trachtman examines is reliant on a series of contemporary factors, and the 
methodology he employs is built on a specialist refinement of empirical social sciences and 
economic rationality. Against this background, it may, nonetheless, be worthwhile recalling that 
the twin phenomena of functional diversification and fragmentation and the accompanying 
constitutionalization of the international legal order – both of which serve the author to predict that 
the future of international law is global government in the sense described that ”international law 
may grow in a way similar to municipal law”115pursuant to the dynamics of cross-functional 
integration – are, in themselves, the logical outcome of a structural tendency sprung up from the 
liberal theory of politics underpinning the domestic liberal state.116 This is a structural tendency 
that became inextricably enshrined within the genealogy of contemporary international law when 
the prototypical institutions of the domestic constitutional liberal state were transposed, as part of 
the First World War peace-settlement, for the first time, with permanent character, to the 
international plane.117 In essence what Trachtman attempts in his book is to flesh the bones of 
this structural tendency of the international legal order through a social-scientific reinterpretation 
of functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to international integration that is aimed to 
produce a methodology with the aspiration to foster processes of “optimal” integration through 
different sectors on a global scale. This aim is, invariably, accompanied in his work by the 
advancement of a methodological agenda which, as M Koskenniemi who examined “the novel 
jurisprudentia universalis as a technical and empirical science”118  has shown, is not without 
parallels in the past of the discipline itself.  However, Trachtman, restricts his normative 
functionalist social science interest to methodologically graduate only the eyes of one of the faces 
of Janus – and, as it can be expected, this is the face of Janus that looks to the future of 
international law. The almost inexistence of any trace of historical analysis in the author´s 
exhaustive methodological tour de force does, thus, warrants a brief comment from the 
perspective of the other face of Janus, that is, the face of Janus that looks to the past of 
international law.  This is especially relevant at a time when international legal scholarship 
appears to be in creative tension between the opposite poles of, on the one hand, its intellectual 
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colonization by an extremely sophisticated – and overall enlightening - IR/IL literature and, on the 
other, and an intra-disciplinary historical turn in international law. In this context, it may be, 
indeed, worthwhile recalling, in paraphrasing Q. Wright, that “in their emphasis on contingency 
[historians] provide a healthy antidote to the overenthusiastic social scientist”.119 Moreover, a 
transposition of Wright´s views to the history of international law might also help one to assess 
the potential that the contribution of the historians of international law can make to the future of 
international law itself. In particular, such a contribution, borrowing from Wright´s own words, 
would be that of making it grow more appreciative of a “balanced sense of continuity and change, 
of uniqueness and repetition, of causation and contingency and of choice and standards” (…) by 
helping it to “better realize the complexity and uncertainty of human affairs, the many factors to be 
considered in making judgments, the dangers of abstraction, of dogmatism, of prediction, of 
action, and of inaction” (…) and to “better understand the abundance and variability of human 
values and the opportunities as well as the insecurities of any situation”. 120 
 
III. Conclusion  
These two books Sovereignty in Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested 
Concept and The Future of International Law. Global Government may not grant themselves 
easily to all international law audiences. This is particularly so in view of the post-modern thought 
intricacies in what some of the authors of Sovereign in Fragments indulge themselves, and 
because of the economic-based-rationality and analytical methodology, including game-theory, 
price theory, transaction costs economics, game theory and others contained in The Future of 
International Law. However, the truth remains that to navigate through the porous borders of 
compartmentalized academic knowledge in the pursuance, as in Kalmo and Skinner´s edited 
collection, of perhaps a chimerical “all- round view of the concept of sovereignty”121  in the 
fragmented fields of contemporary social sciences, or, as in Trachtman´s book, to finely adapt the 
lenses of other disciplines, vocabularies and methodological tools to both influence and assess 
the future of international law, leads to new types of both anti-dogmatic osmosis and intellectual 
synergies for all fields of inquiry involved. Moreover, in spite of the sophisticated methodological 
complexity which lies between the two extremes of cutting-edge types of scholarship contained in 
these books, both works should, be praised from having added new layers of complexity and 
interdisciplinary analysis to the great collection of international lawyers’ reflections on its locus 
classicus: state sovereignty. At the end of the day, the truth remains that we cannot, probably, 
predict, with any degree of scientific certainty, what the future will be, even if new methodological 
lenses are developed to influence its unfolding in accordance with a basic structural tendency of 
the contemporary international order, any more than we can aspire to come up with a perfect 
grasping of an essentially contested concept like sovereignty, even if we rely on the best that 
each discipline has ever distilled about it has to offer us. But, perhaps, that we can, nonetheless, 
anticipate, with a considerable degree of certainty, that international lawyers shall continue to 
elaborate their stories, now in a growingly interdisciplinary field, around the locus classicus of 
international law aware that it is the hope that these stories bring for them (and others) to survive 
to see another sunset what shall, ultimately, keep flowing the tales of the thousand and one 
nights of Westphalia.122   
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